'Home Country Control with Consent': A New Paradigm for Ensuring Trust and Cooperation in the Internal Market?

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol 15, 2012-2013

29 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2013

See all articles by Pierre Schammo

Pierre Schammo

Durham University, School of Law

Date Written: December 13, 2013

Abstract

Home country control has been a long-standing principle of supervisory governance in the internal market. However, in the wake of the financial crisis the principle has come under stress. This paper looks at ways to deal with home country control by putting forward for discussion a new paradigm which I will coin ‘home country control with consent’ (HCC-C). My aim is to examine the building blocks of HCC-C but also to reflect more generally on the merit of a (mostly horizontal) supervisory arrangement which allows other (host) actors to get involved in the decision-making of a home state authority. To describe such involvement, I will use the term ‘interference’. The basic problematic that I seek to address is that of ensuring cooperation and trust between national competent authorities. To identify the building blocks of HCC-C, I will turn to the recently enacted European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) which provides a possible, even if embryonic, template for HCC-C.

Keywords: European Market Infrastructure Regulation, home country control, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), trust, financial crisis

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K22, G18, G28

Suggested Citation

Schammo, Pierre, 'Home Country Control with Consent': A New Paradigm for Ensuring Trust and Cooperation in the Internal Market? (December 13, 2013). Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol 15, 2012-2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2367263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2367263

Pierre Schammo (Contact Author)

Durham University, School of Law ( email )

The Palatine Centre
Stockton Road
Durham, Durham DH1 3LE
United Kingdom

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