Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368045
 


 



A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics & Law


Terrance O'Reilly


Willamette University - College of Law

December 16, 2013

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 183-240, Fall 2014

Abstract:     
In several states, public pension plans are at risk of insolvency within a decade. These risks are significant, and the solutions currently contemplated are likely to fall short of what is necessary to contain the problem. If public pension plans do become insolvent, it seems likely the federal government will bail them out. This Article proposes that the federal government prepare for the prospect of federal financial support of public pension plans by instituting an optional regulatory regime for public pensions. If a state elects not to participate, its public pension plans would be ineligible for federal financial support. In states that do elect to participate, public plans would be eligible for federal financial support in the event of severe financial distress. All public plans in these states would be subject to a federal regulatory regime similar to ERISA, including minimum funding requirements. Congress could also authorize sponsors of regulated plans to revise existing employees’ retirement benefits with respect to future services, an option that is available to private employers. This flexibility would allow for much more significant pension reforms on the state and local level since in many states pension reforms can only alter the benefits of new hires.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: public pensions, bailouts, public finance, fiscal federalism, retirement security, ERISA, insurance, state and local governments

JEL Classification: H75, H81

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: December 16, 2013 ; Last revised: November 28, 2014

Suggested Citation

O'Reilly, Terrance, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics & Law (December 16, 2013). University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 183-240, Fall 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2368045

Contact Information

Terrance O'Reilly (Contact Author)
Willamette University - College of Law ( email )
245 Winter St. SE
Salem, OR 97301
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 671
Downloads: 196
Download Rank: 93,078

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.640 seconds