'Pay for Delay': What Do We Disagree On?
Pierre Marcel Regibeau
Imperial College; Charles River Associates
December 16, 2013
Antitrust concerns about “Pay For Delay” patent settlements are based on two theory of harms, one that stresses the need for Courts to review the validity of patents and one that emphasises the “probabilistic” nature of patent rights. The main weakness of the first theory of harm is that it fails to explain why some forms of patent settlements would be less desirable than others. The “probabilistic” theory of harm raises fundamental questions about the legal obligations of a patent-holder, the type of uncertainty that should be reflected in the probabilistic nature of the patents and whether the theory can be applied to anything but the simplest PFD settlements. The paper also discusses the likely effect of a PDF ban on innovation and reviews both the European approach to recent and on-going PDF cases and the recent Actavis decision of the US Supreme Court.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: Patents, Litigation, Settlements
JEL Classification: K21, K41, L24, L41working papers series
Date posted: December 17, 2013
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