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http://ssrn.com/abstract=237139
 
 

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The Tenuous Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives


Canice Prendergast


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 2000

NBER Working Paper No. w7815

Abstract:     
Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had much success. Indeed, the data seem to suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives, rather than the posited negative tradeoff. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, the activities that they should engage in are well known, and firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs. By contrast, when the situation is more uncertain, firms know less about how workers should be spending their time. As a result, the delegate responsibility to workers but, to constraint heir discretion, base compensation on observed output. Hence, uncertainty and output-based pay are positively related. I argue that parts of the existing empirical literature are better explained through this lens than with the standard model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: July 27, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Prendergast, Canice, The Tenuous Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives (July 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7815. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=237139

Contact Information

Canice Prendergast (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7309 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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