Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371768
 


 



A Theory of Competitive Framing


Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Bernhard Ganglmair


University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics

Steven Tschantz


Vanderbilt University - Department of Mathematics

March 24, 2014

Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper No. 2371768
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-13

Abstract:     
In adversarial contests, we observe seemingly inconsistent claims about factual or scientific evidence. In this paper, we build a model that can explain the existence and effects of such claims. To do this, we turn scientific inquiry upside down. Instead of objective truth seekers who formulate hypotheses and then gather evidence to test them, we model behavior by self-interested parties who strategically choose hypotheses to influence a decision maker – after the evidence has already been produced and discovered. We show that equilibrium decisions are biased away from the best explanation, and the bias favors the party making the more extreme claim.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: framing, evidence-based decision making, adversarial justice, Bayesian hypothesis testing, litigation games, expert testimony

JEL Classification: C11, C72, D72, K41, L22

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 25, 2013 ; Last revised: March 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Froeb, Luke and Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tschantz, Steven, A Theory of Competitive Framing (March 24, 2014). Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper No. 2371768; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2371768

Contact Information

Luke M. Froeb (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Bernhard Ganglmair
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics ( email )
800 W Campbell Rd (SM31)
Richardson, TX 75080
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.utdallas.edu/~ganglmair
Steven T. Tschantz
Vanderbilt University - Department of Mathematics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37240
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 273
Downloads: 90
Download Rank: 169,178

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 1.203 seconds