Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371768
 


 



Adversarial Decision-Making: Choosing Between Models Constructed by Interested Parties


Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Bernhard Ganglmair


University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics; Boston University - Department of Economics

Steven Tschantz


Vanderbilt University - Department of Mathematics

March 28, 2016

Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper No. 2371768
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-13

Abstract:     
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice between competing interpretations of evidence ("models'") constructed by interested parties. We show that if a court cannot perfectly determine which party's model is more likely to have generated the evidence, then adversaries face a tradeoff: a model further away from the best (most likely) interpretation has a lower probability of winning, but also a higher payoff following a win. We characterize the equilibrium of such a game of persuasion, in which both adversaries construct optimal models, and use the characterization to compare adversarial decision-making to an inquisitorial benchmark. We find that adversarial decisions are biased, and the bias favors the party with the less-likely, and more extreme, interpretation of the evidence. Court bias disappears when the court is better able to distinguish between the likelihoods of the competing models, or as the amount of evidence grows.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: adversarial justice; evidence-based decision-making; expert testimony; inquisitorial justice; litigation; persuasion games; science vs. advocacy

JEL Classification: C72, D72, K41


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Date posted: December 25, 2013 ; Last revised: June 3, 2016

Suggested Citation

Froeb, Luke and Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tschantz, Steven, Adversarial Decision-Making: Choosing Between Models Constructed by Interested Parties (March 28, 2016). Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper No. 2371768; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2371768

Contact Information

Luke M. Froeb (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Bernhard Ganglmair
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics ( email )
800 W Campbell Rd (SM31)
Richardson, TX 75080
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.utdallas.edu/~ganglmair
Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )
270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Steven T. Tschantz
Vanderbilt University - Department of Mathematics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37240
United States
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