Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375228
 


 



When an Inefficient Competitor Makes Higher Profit than its Efficient Rival


Debapriya Sen


Ryerson University

Giorgos Stamatopoulos


University of Crete

January 6, 2014


Abstract:     
We present examples of cost-asymmetric duopoly games where the inefficient firm can obtain higher payoff than its efficient rival. Firms compete in a Cournot fashion and their quantities are chosen by their managers. We assume that managers are offered two types of incentive contracts, the pure profit or the pure revenue contract. We allow for mixed and correlated strategies in the contract stage and derive the implications of the resulting choices. Surprisingly, we show that in equilibrium the less efficient firm can obtain higher market share and also higher profit than its more efficient rival. This result holds under both pure and mixed Nash equilibria and also under a robust set of correlated equilibria.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: managerial contract, cost asymmetry, mixed strategy

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L21

working papers series





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Date posted: January 7, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Sen, Debapriya and Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, When an Inefficient Competitor Makes Higher Profit than its Efficient Rival (January 6, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375228

Contact Information

Debapriya Sen
Ryerson University ( email )
Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto
Toronto, GA Ontario M5B 2K3
Canada
Giorgos Stamatopoulos (Contact Author)
University of Crete ( email )
Rethymno, GR-74100
Greece
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