The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation

Jeffrey N. Gordon

Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

December 24, 2013

Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 464

“Benefit-cost analysis” as applied to financial regulation is a serious category mistake that has the potential to stymie regulation aimed at the reduction of systemic risk in favor of privileging a status quo that we know is unstable. Benefit-cost analysis, which gained prominence from its applications in health safety, and environmental regulation, contemplates an omniscient social planner who can calculate costs and benefits generated by a system that is essentially stable, because it rests on natural constraints, in particular the laws of chemistry, biology, and physics. By contrast, finance is a constructed system, created by financial regulation itself and subsequent adaptations. Any non-trivial new rule would change the system of finance in ways that are hard to foresee and thus would undercut the value of a prior calculation of benefits and costs. Instead, optimal financial regulation policy should be understood as based on a series of trade-offs of values that are normatively derived, for example: the desire to achieve the economic benefits from the free flow of capital and the ready availability of credit as balanced against the risks of systemic distress and the associated economic disruption. These value trade-offs will produce subsidiary principles of pragmatic design, for example: minimize the extent to which financial institution can free-ride on systemic stability costs paid by others; provide regulators with sufficient information to observe the build-up of imbalance in the financial system and the power to make regulatory modifications accordingly. Rather than insist on a meaningless, if not misleading, benefit cost analysis that seems not required by any substantive regulatory statute, a reviewing court should apply rationality review to a regulatory agency’s application of pragmatic judgment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Benefit-cost analysis, financial regulation, Glass-Steagall, market funds, judicial review

JEL Classification: G28, K23, P1

Accepted Paper Series

Download This Paper

Date posted: January 14, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Jeffrey N., The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation (December 24, 2013). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 464. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378562

Contact Information

Jeffrey N. Gordon (Contact Author)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2316 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
B-1050 Brussels
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 410
Downloads: 127
Download Rank: 78,043

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.516 seconds