Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379707
 


 



Where are the Jobs in the Jobs Act? An Examination of the Uneasy Connection between Securities Disclosure and Job Creation


Ian K. Peck


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; Kirkland & Ellis LLP

May 1, 2013


Abstract:     
The JOBS Act, passed in April 2012, is designed to produce American jobs through removing various regulatory barriers for small companies to access investor capital. As the regulations continue to be implemented, commentators have dissected the various ways in which the JOBS Act attempts to achieve this goal. One of the methods involves making the IPO process initially less burdensome, through scaling back financial and corporate governance disclosures. Crowdfunding, which will eventually permit companies to raise investor capital through an online “funding portal”, has garnered both deep criticism from regulators and praise from small business owners. Yet little attention has been paid to the notion that the very reason for disclosure reform is job creation. This matters because job creation has not historically played a direct role in the reform of securities disclosure statutes and regulations. This Article analyzes what role, if any, job creation should occupy in the reform of securities disclosure laws. After establishing the normative baseline for disclosure theory and reform, this Article highlights various unintended consequences of using job creation as a justification for reform and proposes a framework for understanding job creation-based disclosure reforms going forward.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

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Date posted: January 16, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Peck, Ian K., Where are the Jobs in the Jobs Act? An Examination of the Uneasy Connection between Securities Disclosure and Job Creation (May 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2379707

Contact Information

Ian Peck (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
555 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
United States
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