Manuel R. Vargas
University of San Francisco - School of Law; University of San Francisco - College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Jurisprudence, 2014, Forthcoming
Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2014-04
This essay considers two aspects of Joseph Raz's recent work: (1) his theory of responsibility, arising out his reflections on something he calls "our Being in the World," and (2) the methodological presumptions that guide his account. On the matter of responsibility, his notion of "domains of secure competence" is suggestive but unclear. Natural regimentations of the idea suggest a host of problems in the specification of competence, and whether the notion is to be understood subjectively or third-personally. On the matter of methodology, Raz's approach gives rise to some serious concerns, including (1) whether armchair philosophical reflection is the best way to generate an account, as he aims to, of essential features of experience, and (2) how to square his approach with accounts of responsibility, normativity, and rationality rooted in non-experiential but predictive and explanatorily valuable accounts of these matters.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Joseph Raz, jurisprudence, philosophy of law, responsibility
Date posted: January 24, 2014 ; Last revised: January 30, 2014
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