Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384288
 


 



Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality


Jeremy Greenwood


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nezih Guner


ICREA-MOVE; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Georgi Kocharkov


University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Cezar Santos


University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

January 2014

NBER Working Paper No. w19829

Abstract:     
Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.

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Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

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Date posted: January 25, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Greenwood, Jeremy and Guner, Nezih and Kocharkov, Georgi and Santos, Cezar, Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality (January 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w19829. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384288

Contact Information

Jeremy Greenwood (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1505 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://jeremygreenwood.net
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Nezih Guner
ICREA-MOVE ( email )
Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain
Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )
Carrer de Sant Antoni Maria Claret, 282
Barcelona, Barcelona 08041
Spain
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
Georgi Kocharkov
University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany
Cezar Santos
University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
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