Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?
R. A. Duff
University of Minnesota Law School; University of Stirling - Department of Philosophy
January 29, 2014
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-05
On the basis of an Aristotelian account of the defence of duress and the partial defence of provocation, I ask why the compassion that can motivate someone to assist another’s suicide, or even to commit voluntary euthanasia, should not ground an analogous defence; and, if it should, whether such an emotion-based defence should be understood as justificatory or as excusatory.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: duress, provocation, assisting suicide, euthanasia, justification and excuse
Date posted: January 31, 2014
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