Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389446
 


 



Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on the Federal Exchanges


David Gamage


University of California, Berkeley - Boalt Hall School of Law

Darien Shanske


University of California, Davis - School of Law

February 1, 2014

State Tax Notes, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2014
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2389446
UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 368

Abstract:     
This Essay refutes Adler’s and Cannon’s argument that the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) does not authorize premium tax credits for insurance policies purchased from the federal healthcare Exchanges. Adler’s and Cannon’s argument is the basis of challenges in a number of ongoing lawsuits, including Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius and Halbig v. Sebelius. This Essay conducts a textual analysis of the Affordable Care Act and concludes that the text clearly authorizes premium tax credits for insurance policies purchased from the federal healthcare Exchanges.

On November 7th, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of the King v. Burwell case. The Supreme Court will thus consider the arguments refuted in this Essay. If the Supreme Court accepts these arguments, commentators expect that the result will dramatically undermine the functioning of Obamacare in many states, potentially generating far worse outcomes than the status quo prior to Obamacare.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Obamacare, healthcare reform, health, tax credits, Adler, Cannon, Pruitt, Halbig, Sebelius, Affordable Care Act, ACA

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Date posted: February 1, 2014 ; Last revised: November 8, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gamage, David and Shanske, Darien, Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on the Federal Exchanges (February 1, 2014). State Tax Notes, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2014; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2389446; UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 368. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389446

Contact Information

David Gamage (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Boalt Hall School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
Darien Shanske
University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )
400 Mrak Hall Dr
Davis, CA 95616-5201
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