Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=239249
 
 

References (28)



 
 

Citations (48)



 
 

Footnotes (18)



 


 



Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss Cantons


Lars P. Feld


Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

John G. Matsusaka


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; USC Gould School of Law

August 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 323; and USC Finance & Business Econ. Working Paper No. 01-8

Abstract:     
New government spending must be approved by a referendum of citizens in many Swiss cantons. This decisionmaking procedure seems like a simple way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, but little systematic evidence is available concerning its effect on spending outcomes. We estimate spending regressions for Swiss cantons using panel data from 1986 to 1997. After controlling for demographics and other determinants of spending, mandatory referendums on new spending are found to reduce the size of the budget by 17% for the median canton.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Budget referendums, initiatives, government spending

JEL Classification: H0, H3

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Date posted: November 6, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Feld, Lars P. and Matsusaka, John G., Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss Cantons (August 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 323; and USC Finance & Business Econ. Working Paper No. 01-8. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=239249 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.239249

Contact Information

Lars P. Feld
Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg ( email )
Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
John G. Matsusaka (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
Department of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)

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References:  28
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