Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=239258
 
 

Citations



 


 



Asymmetric Auctions


Eric Maskin


Princeton University - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

John G. Riley


affiliation not provided to SSRN


The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, Iss. 3, July 2000

Abstract:     
The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected surplus. Thus, in particular, the two most common auction institutions-the open 'English' and the sealed high-bid auction-are equivalent despite their rather different strategic properties.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: July 26, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Maskin, Eric and Riley, John G., Asymmetric Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, Iss. 3, July 2000 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=239258

Contact Information

Eric S. Maskin (Contact Author)
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Institute for Advanced Study
Einstein Drive West Building Room 318
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
(609) 734-8309 (Phone)
(609) 951-4457 (Fax)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-4167 (Phone)
(617) 495-7730 (Fax)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
John G. Riley
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Feedback to SSRN


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