Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392623
 
 

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Span of Control and Span of Attention


Oriana Bandiera


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Andrea Prat


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

Raffaella Sadun


Harvard University - Strategy Unit; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Julie Wulf


Harvard Business School

April 30, 2014

Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 12-053
Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 14-22

Abstract:     
Using novel data on CEO time use, we document the relationship between the size and composition of the executive team and the attention of the CEO. We combine information about CEO span of control for a sample of 65 companies with detailed data on how CEOs allocate their time, which we define as their span of attention. CEOs with larger executive teams do not save time for personal use, or to cultivate external constituencies. Instead, CEOs with broader spans of control invest more in a “team” model of interaction. They spend more time internally, specifically in pre-planned meetings that have more participants from different functions. The complementarity between span of control and the team model of interaction is more prevalent in larger firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: February 9, 2014 ; Last revised: April 30, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bandiera, Oriana and Prat, Andrea and Sadun, Raffaella and Wulf, Julie, Span of Control and Span of Attention (April 30, 2014). Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 12-053; Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 14-22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392623

Contact Information

Oriana Bandiera
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7519 (Phone)
+44 20 7055 6951 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Andrea Prat
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Raffaella Sadun
Harvard University - Strategy Unit ( email )
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.hbs.edu/rsadun
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/staff/person.asp?id=1758
Julie M. Wulf (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA
United States
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