Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393551
 


 



Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American Federalism


Andrew Coan


University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law; University of Wisconsin Law School

February 10, 2014

Boston University Law Review, Forthcoming
Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1249

Abstract:     
The anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles announced in New York v. United States and NFIB v. Sebelius have great potential importance, but the most prominent justification for them is seriously flawed. This Essay elaborates a more persuasive and largely neglected alternative, grounded in the deep structure of American federalism. Simply put, both commandeering and coercive conditional spending transfer control of state governments from their constitutionally designated electoral constituencies to Congress. This threat is probably insufficient to justify the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles -- it is only one element of a more complex federalism calculus -- but any persuasive critique or defense of these doctrines must take account of it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: Commandeering, Coercion, Conditional Spending, Federalism, Spending Power

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Date posted: February 11, 2014 ; Last revised: March 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Coan, Andrew, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American Federalism (February 10, 2014). Boston University Law Review, Forthcoming; Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1249. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393551

Contact Information

Andrew Coan (Contact Author)
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
University of Wisconsin Law School ( email )
975 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States
HOME PAGE: http://law.wisc.edu/profiles/index.php?iEmployeeID=413
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