Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393630
 


 



Sub-Regulating Elections


Jennifer Nou


University of Chicago - Law School

March 14, 2014

Supreme Court Review, 2014
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 462

Abstract:     
Agency deadlocks are a recurring feature of election-related administrative agencies. Such agencies are often designed by Congress with even-numbered bipartisan commissions with majoritarian voting rules. Using Arizona v. Intertribal Council as a springboard, this Article examines how courts should treat commissioner tie votes when they concern issues of statutory interpretation. In particular, it argues that courts should not defer to the blocking coalition, but rather apply an institutional understanding of Skidmore deference to interpretive documents prepared by politically insulated agency actors, when available. The proposal seeks to create greater incentives for internal agency independence in the presence of partisan deadlocks and the development of agency expertise through sub-regulatory guidance documents such as agency manuals and opinion letters. The analysis also reflects more broadly on the intersections between federal election administration and administrative law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: federal election administration, Election Assistance Commission, Federal Election Commission, Skidmore deference, proof-of-citizenship requirements, voter identification

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Date posted: February 11, 2014 ; Last revised: May 21, 2014

Suggested Citation

Nou, Jennifer, Sub-Regulating Elections (March 14, 2014). Supreme Court Review, 2014; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 462. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393630

Contact Information

Jennifer Nou (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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