Four Challenges Confronting a Moral Conception of Universal Human Rights
Eric D. Blumenson
Suffolk University Law School
July 31, 2014
George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 47, Forthcoming
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 14-6
This essay describes some fundamental debates concerning the nature and possibility of universal human rights, conceived as a species of justice rather than law. It identifies four claims that are entailed by such rights and some significant problems each claim confronts. The designation Universal Human Rights explicitly asserts three of them: paradigmatic human rights purport to be (1) universal, in that their protections and obligations bind every society regardless of its laws and mores; (2) human, in that the rights belong equally to every person by virtue of her humanity, regardless of her character, social standing, disabilities, or other individual attributes; and (3) matters of right that afford certain fundamental individual interests priority over the community’s wishes or welfare. Human rights differ widely in what they afford a right to — life, religious liberty, adequate nutrition, etc. — but all share a fourth claim on which each distinct right is premised, that (4) the right specified serves to safeguard one such fundamental individual interest.
These claims generate uncertainty and disagreement, even among those who do not doubt the reality of human rights. Some theorists favor putting these claims to rest by pursuing a different understanding of human rights that makes sense without them. The more modest aim here is to help inform that proposal by presenting these claims and challenges as concisely and transparently as possible.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 14, 2014 ; Last revised: August 6, 2014
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