Restricting the Means of Exchange within Organizations
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
February 14, 2014
European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 1999
This paper considers why firms often ban monetary exchange between their employees, while encouraging these trades through other means, such as through the reciprocation of favours or barter. Despite classical inefficiencies associated with non-monetary exchange, we illustrate two themes as to why non-monetary trade may be preferred to allowing money. First, the use of non-monetary trade may affect the allocation of rents in surplus-enhancing ways, as agents respond strategically to the existence of these rents. Second, non-monetary trade improves the ability of agents to impose sanctions on those who act dishonestly.
Keywords: Non-monetary exchange, Rent seeking, Surplus enhancing sanctions
JEL Classification: D21, L23
Date posted: February 16, 2014
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