Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

Matthew A. Serfling

University of Tennessee- Department of Finance

July 7, 2015

I exploit the adoption of state-level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws and that this result is stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm’s degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. These results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

Keywords: Capital structure, Firing costs, Employment protection, Financial distress costs

JEL Classification: G32, G33, J63, K31

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Date posted: February 16, 2014 ; Last revised: July 8, 2015

Suggested Citation

Serfling, Matthew A., Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions (July 7, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396599

Contact Information

Matthew A. Serfling (Contact Author)
University of Tennessee- Department of Finance ( email )
Haslam College of Bussiness
Knoxvillee, TN TN 37916
United States
8659741952 (Phone)
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