SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (14)

Beta

 
 

Citations (22)

Beta

 


 



Competing Against Bundles

Barry J. Nalebuff
Yale School of Management


August 20, 2000

Yale School of Management Working Paper No. ES-02

Abstract:     
In this paper, we show that a firm that sells a bundle of complementary products will have a substantial advantage over rivals who sell the component products individually. Furthermore, this advantage increases with the size of the bundle. Once there are four or more items, the bundle seller does better than when it sells each component individually. This model helps explain one factor in how Microsoft achieved dominance in the Office software suite against pre-existing and well-established rivals in each component.

This paper is a sequel to Bundling [Nalebuff (1999) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=185193].

JEL Classifications: D43, L11, L12, C7

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 20, 2000 ; Last revised: October 21, 2003

Suggested Citation

Nalebuff, Barry J., Competing Against Bundles (August 20, 2000). Yale School of Management Working Paper No. ES-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=239684 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.239684


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Barry Nalebuff (Contact Author)
Yale School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-5968 (Phone)
203-432-6974 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,222
Downloads: 2,299
Download Rank: 1,185
References: 14
Citations: 22

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apolloa 3 in 0.469 seconds.