Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396892
 


 



Discounting and Criminals' Implied Risk Preferences


Murat C. Mungan


Florida State University - College of Law

Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

February 16, 2014

FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 672
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-15
FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper

Abstract:     
It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. An important implication of this assumption within the Beckerian law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. This note adds to existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: Crime, deterrence, risk, punishment, discounting

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K42

working papers series


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Date posted: February 17, 2014 ; Last revised: April 4, 2014

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C. and Klick, Jonathan, Discounting and Criminals' Implied Risk Preferences (February 16, 2014). FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 672; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-15; FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396892 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396892

Contact Information

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)
Florida State University - College of Law ( email )
425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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