Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404519
 


 



Facilitating the Commons Inside Out


Hanoch Dagan


Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Tsilly Dagan


Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law

March 4, 2014


Abstract:     
Commons property is a true challenge to the law, especially in a legal context that respects individual mobility, which is key to freedom and autonomy. While a tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, the sustainability – let alone flourishing – of the commons is far from obvious either. But the rewards of the latter trajectory are critical: a successful commons property can generate significant economic benefits, due to its intrinsic advantages of economies of scale, risk-spreading, specialization, and synergy. These benefits multiply in the context of social commons property regimes that function as the loci and engines of meaningful interpersonal relationships; indeed, they at times even become constitutive elements of commoners’ identities. This Essay explores examples of governance mechanisms for the collective management of resources as well as tax tools for collective production that can support the success of these social commons property regimes. These legal devices, which set (respectively) the internal rules of the game and provide external incentives, both counter the potentially destructive dynamics of the commons property and help preserve the noncommodified aspects of its owners’ community.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

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Date posted: March 13, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Dagan, Hanoch and Dagan, Tsilly, Facilitating the Commons Inside Out (March 4, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2404519

Contact Information

Hanoch Dagan (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
+972 3 640 7302 (Phone)
Tsilly Dagan
Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
972-3-5317093 (Phone)
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