Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406093
 


 



Coasean Bargaining over the Structural Constitution


Aziz Z. Huq


University of Chicago Law School

April 2014

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 114, 2014
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 471

Abstract:     
The Constitution allocates entitlements to individuals and also institutions such as states and branches. It is familiar fare that individuals’ entitlements are routinely deployed not only as shields against unconstitutional action, but also as bargaining chips when negotiating with the state. By contrast, the possibility that branches and states could bargain over structural entitlements has largely escaped scholarly or judicial attention. Yet institutional negotiation over federalism and separation-of-powers interests is both endemic and unavoidable. To ascertain when such negotiation should be allowed, this Article develops a general theory of negotiated structural arrangements by leveraging doctrinal, economic and political theory insights. Negotiated structural outcomes, the Article concludes, should be deemed constitutional absent a clear demonstration of negative externalities or paternalism-warranting ‘internalities.’

Number of Pages in PDF File: 75

Keywords: Separation of powers; economic analysis of public law

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Date posted: March 9, 2014 ; Last revised: April 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Huq, Aziz Z., Coasean Bargaining over the Structural Constitution (April 2014). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 114, 2014; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 471. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406093

Contact Information

Aziz Z. Huq (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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