Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406636
 


 



Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice


Albert H. Choi


University of Virginia School of Law

July 30, 2015

Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2014-07
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014-19

Abstract:     
An entrepreneur can organize either a for-profit or a non-profit firm to sell product or service to consumers in the long run. Because quality is non-verifiable and unobservable investment can still produce low quality, in equilibrium, consumers impose relational sanctions when low quality is delivered. With sufficient relational sanctions, both types of firms produce the same expected quality. However, because the non-distribution constraint reduces the temptation to shirk from investment, non-profit firm is subject to shorter relational sanctions, which can make the non-profit status attractive even for the entrepreneur who cares only about the return she gets from the firm. Non-profit status is preferred, for instance, as the investment-quality relationship gets weaker or as stronger market competition reduces the profit margin. The paper also shows how both types of firms can co-exist in a market when the legal enforcement against non-profit weakens as the number of non-profit firms increases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32


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Date posted: March 10, 2014 ; Last revised: December 10, 2015

Suggested Citation

Choi, Albert H., Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice (July 30, 2015). Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2014-07; Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014-19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406636 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406636

Contact Information

Albert H. Choi (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

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