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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406895
 
 

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Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities


Nicole M. Boyson


Northeastern University - D’Amore-McKim School of Business

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach


Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Rene M. Stulz


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

November 27, 2014

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2014-03-01
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2014-01
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 14-21

Abstract:     
We propose a theory of regulatory arbitrage by banks and test it using trust preferred securities (TPS) issuance. We assume that banks have an optimal capital structure that depends on their business model. If a bank’s optimal capital structure meets regulatory capital requirements with a sufficient buffer, the bank is unconstrained by these requirements. We expect that unconstrained banks will not issue TPS, that constrained banks will issue TPS and engage in other forms of regulatory arbitrage, and that TPS banks will be riskier than other banks with the same amount of regulatory capital. Our empirical evidence supports these predictions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Regulatory arbitrage; bank capital requirements; quality of bank capital

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

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Date posted: March 13, 2014 ; Last revised: December 3, 2014

Suggested Citation

Boyson, Nicole M. and Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Stulz, Rene M., Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities (November 27, 2014). Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2014-03-01; Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 14-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406895

Contact Information

Nicole M. Boyson
Northeastern University - D’Amore-McKim School of Business ( email )
360 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
617-373-4775 (Phone)
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
Extranef 211
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
++41-21-693-0098 (Phone)
++41-21-693-3010 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/fahlenbrach.html
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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