Administering the Tax System We Have

Also published at ETHICAL DUTIES TO THE TAX SYSTEM: A HANDBOOK 67 (Scott A. Schumacher & Michael Hatfield, eds. 2015)

63 Duke L.J. 1717 (2014)

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-20

54 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2014 Last revised: 24 Sep 2016

See all articles by Kristin E. Hickman

Kristin E. Hickman

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law

Date Written: March 14, 2014

Abstract

Traditional perceptions of tax exceptionalism from administrative law doctrines and requirements have been predicated at least in part on the importance of the tax code’s revenue raising function. Yet, Congress increasingly relies on the IRS to administer government programs that have little to do with raising revenue and much more to do with distributing government benefits to the economically disadvantaged, subsidizing approved activities, and regulating outright certain economic sectors like nonprofits, pensions, and now health care. As the attentions of the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service shift away from raising revenue and toward these other matters, the revenue-based justification for tax exceptionalism from general administrative law norms fades. To demonstrate the shift, the Article incorporates empirical analysis of Treasury and IRS regulatory activity over time.

Keywords: tax exceptionalism, administrative law, treasury regulations, tax administration

JEL Classification: K23, K34

Suggested Citation

Hickman, Kristin E., Administering the Tax System We Have (March 14, 2014). Also published at ETHICAL DUTIES TO THE TAX SYSTEM: A HANDBOOK 67 (Scott A. Schumacher & Michael Hatfield, eds. 2015), 63 Duke L.J. 1717 (2014), Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2409069

Kristin E. Hickman (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-2915 (Phone)

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