Evasive Shareholder Meetings
Temple University - Department of Finance
New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business
November 3, 2015
We study the strategic scheduling of annual shareholder meetings. When companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters, they tend to experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the six months after the meeting and announce earnings below expectations over the subsequent year. Companies appear to schedule meetings in remote locations when the managers have private, adverse information about future performance and wish to discourage scrutiny by shareholders, analysts, and the media. However, shareholders do not decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction. We find that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51
Keywords: Shareholder meetings, corporate voting
JEL Classification: G34, K22
Date posted: March 17, 2014 ; Last revised: November 4, 2015
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