Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411257
 


 



The Uneasy Case against Tax Lien Subordination


Shu-Yi Oei


Tulane Law School

March 18, 2014

Pittsburgh Tax Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2014
Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 14-4

Abstract:     
I.R.C. § 6323, which governs how the federal tax lien ranks against the interests of the taxpayer’s other creditors, subordinates the tax lien to the claims of other creditors in various ways. Tax lien subordination is commonly justified on the grounds that it enhances taxpayer asset value, facilitates commercial transactions, and reduces monitoring costs for private creditors. This short symposium essay argues, however, that these benefits may be illusory. Tax lien subordination may, in fact, be unnecessarily costly and distortive and may lead to unfair distributive results. This essay suggests that the tax lien priority scheme might be made less costly by reducing its multiple levels of subordination. This could be accomplished in two ways: First, by reducing the magnitude or number of the superpriorities and other prioritized interests; and second, by eliminating the priority of the four horsemen over the un-noticed federal tax lien, or, alternatively, by moving away from a system of pure public notice and toward a semi-private inquiry-based system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Tax, Tax Policy, Tax Procedure, Tax Administration Tax Liens, Article 9, Uniform Commercial Code, Secured Credit

JEL Classification: E62, H20, H21, H22, H23, H24. H25, H26, H29

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Date posted: March 19, 2014 ; Last revised: August 8, 2014

Suggested Citation

Oei, Shu-Yi, The Uneasy Case against Tax Lien Subordination (March 18, 2014). Pittsburgh Tax Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2014; Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 14-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411257

Contact Information

Shu-Yi Oei (Contact Author)
Tulane Law School ( email )
6329 Freret Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
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