Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411270
 


 



Outside In or Inside Out?: Counting Merger Efficiencies Inside and Out of the Relevant Market


Jan M. Rybnicek


Federal Trade Commission

Joshua D. Wright


Federal Trade Commission; George Mason University School of Law

March 18, 2014


Abstract:     
Despite relatively successful efforts to modernize the analytical approach for assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger in the United States, antitrust doctrine and agency practice unfortunately have not similarly incorporated advances in economics with respect to the analysis of efficiencies justifications. Current antitrust doctrine and agency practice in the United States permits the antitrust agencies to challenge, and the federal courts to block, a transaction when there is a substantial risk that the merger may cause anticompetitive harm in one market even when those harms are far outweighed by efficiencies benefits in another market. Rejection of out-of-market efficiencies is an obsolete approach to a welfare-based antitrust regime that was born out of an era in which efficiencies justifications in merger cases generally were viewed with considerable skepticism.. In this contribution to a tribute to William E. Kovacic, who both as a scholar and public servant studied how enforcement programs are shaped by the evolution of antitrust norms, we discuss the evolution of the treatment of out-of-market efficiencies in the United States and around the world, and we argue that the United States courts and antitrust agencies should update antitrust doctrine and agency practice to require a serious and committed consideration of out-of-market efficiencies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: mergers, antitrust, efficiencies, Kovacic, out-of-market, cross-market balancing

JEL Classification: L40, L22

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 21, 2014 ; Last revised: September 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Rybnicek, Jan M. and Wright, Joshua D., Outside In or Inside Out?: Counting Merger Efficiencies Inside and Out of the Relevant Market (March 18, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411270 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411270

Contact Information

Jan M. Rybnicek
Federal Trade Commission ( email )
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)
Federal Trade Commission ( email )
601 New Jersey Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 762
Downloads: 115
Download Rank: 147,200

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.375 seconds