Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414748
 


 



Presidential Settlements


Adam S. Zimmerman


Loyola Law School Los Angeles

March 25, 2014

163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-14

Abstract:     
Large groups repeatedly turn to the White House to collectively resolve complex disputes, much like a class action. Such presidential settlements go back at least as far as the early republic, as well as the Progressive Era, when Teddy Roosevelt famously brokered settlements among private groups following a rash of accidental injuries and deaths in mining, rail, and even, football. More modern variants include mass compensation schemes like the Holocaust Victim Settlement, Pan Am Flight 103 Settlement, and the BP Oil Spill Settlement brokered by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. In each case, the President helped resolve a sprawling class action-like dispute among warring parties, while also advancing a broader executive agenda. Just as the President has extended power over the administrative state, presidential settlements demonstrate the growth of executive authority in mass dispute resolution to provide restitution for widespread harm.

But this use of executive power creates problems for victims purportedly served by presidential settlements. When the President settles massive private disputes, he resolves them like other forms of complex litigation, but without the judicial review, transparency, and participation thought necessary to resolve potential conflicts of interests among the victims. The Presidents’ other duties as the Chief Executive also aggravate conflicts with groups who may rely entirely on such settlements for relief.

This Article recommends that the President adopt complex litigation principles to reduce conflicts of interests, to increase transparency, and to improve public participation in White House driven settlements. Envisioning the President as the “Settler-In-Chief,” this Article also raises new questions about how the coordinate branches of government, as well as actors inside the White House, may regulate executive settlement practice consistent with the Separation of Powers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 70

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 27, 2014 ; Last revised: April 3, 2014

Suggested Citation

Zimmerman, Adam S., Presidential Settlements (March 25, 2014). 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414748

Contact Information

Adam S. Zimmerman (Contact Author)
Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.lls.edu/aboutus/facultyadministration/faculty/facultylists-z/zimmermanadam/
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 653
Downloads: 73
Download Rank: 194,380

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.375 seconds