How Notice-and-Takedown Regimes Create Markets for Music on YouTube: An Empirical Study

21 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2014

See all articles by Paul J. Heald

Paul J. Heald

University of Illinois College of Law

Date Written: March 26, 2014

Abstract

In theory, notice-and-takedown regimes can lower transaction costs by facilitating communication between users and copyright owners, especially where content filtering automates much of the process. This market study tests the transaction costs theory by tracking 90 songs on YouTube that reached number one on the U.S., French, and Brazilian pop charts from 1930 to 1960. The data collected includes the identity of the uploader, type of upload, number of views, date of upload, and monetization status. YouTube uploads of a sample of 385 popular songs from 1919-1926 are also charted. An analysis of the data demonstrates that the DMCA safe harbor system as applied to YouTube helps maintain public access to many old songs by allowing those possessing copies (primarily infringers) to communicate relatively costlessly with copyright owners to satisfy the market of potential listeners.

Keywords: copyright, YouTube, DMCA, notice, takedown, songs, safe harbor, public domain

JEL Classification: K11, O34

Suggested Citation

Heald, Paul J., How Notice-and-Takedown Regimes Create Markets for Music on YouTube: An Empirical Study (March 26, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416519

Paul J. Heald (Contact Author)

University of Illinois College of Law ( email )

504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
706-372-2567 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.illinois.edu/faculty/profile/PaulHeald

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