Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417532
 


 



Compulsory Licensing - Did Patent Violations During the Great War Discourage Invention?


Joerg Baten


University of Tuebingen

Nicola Bianchi


Stanford University - Department of Economics

Petra Moser


Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

August 28, 2014


Abstract:     
This paper examines whether the US decision during World War I to violate enemy-owned patents - through compulsory licensing - discouraged invention. Estimates from a new data set of German patents indicate a 28 percent increase in invention. Controls for patent quality suggest that only a small share of the increase was due to lower quality, strategic patents. Firm-level data suggest that compulsory licensing facilitated competitive entry into fields with licensing. Firms whose patents had been licensed began to patent more in research fields with licensing. The increase in patenting was strongest for fields with low levels of pre-existing competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Patents, innovation, compulsory licensing, economic history

JEL Classification: O3, O34, O38, N3

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Date posted: March 30, 2014 ; Last revised: August 29, 2014

Suggested Citation

Baten, Joerg and Bianchi, Nicola and Moser, Petra, Compulsory Licensing - Did Patent Violations During the Great War Discourage Invention? (August 28, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417532

Contact Information

Joerg Baten
University of Tuebingen ( email )
Wilhelmstr. 19
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany
Nicola Bianchi
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
Petra Moser (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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