Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418200
 


 



Business Angels’ Perspectives on Exit by IPO


Cécile Carpentier


Laval University; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO); University of Lille II - European Center for Corporate Control Studies

Jean-Marc Suret


Laval University; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO); European Center for Corporate Control Studies

November 30, 2013


Abstract:     
We analyze exit-related perceptions of the members of a large, well-structured Canadian angel group. Because they invest in high tech deals larger than CAN$1.2 million, together with venture capitalists and a matching fund, these angels should consider the initial public offering (IPO) as a possible exit mode. However, they show a strong preference for the trade sale. This preference is consistent with the economies of scope hypothesis: getting big fast has become more important because large firms can fully and rapidly exploit innovations, resulting in more small firm acquisitions. Securities regulation is also perceived as a major impediment to exiting onto the stock market. Both reasons explain why IPOs are not considered an exit mode. Reluctance to exit through an IPO increases with angels’ experience. Our observations have implications for entrepreneurs, business angels and policy makers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: business angel, exit, entrepreneurial venture, securities regulation

JEL Classification: L26, M13, D81, G24

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Date posted: April 1, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Carpentier, Cécile and Suret, Jean-Marc, Business Angels’ Perspectives on Exit by IPO (November 30, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2418200

Contact Information

Cécile Carpentier
Laval University ( email )
Pavilion Palasis Prince
Quebec, Quebec G1V 0A6
Canada
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )
2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
University of Lille II - European Center for Corporate Control Studies ( email )
2 rue de Mulhouse
Lille, 59800
France
Jean-Marc Suret (Contact Author)
Laval University ( email )
Accounting School
Quebec, P.Q. G1K 7P4
Canada
418-656-7134 (Phone)
418-656-7746 (Fax)
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )
1130 rue Sherbrooke Ouest
Bureau 1400
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2M8
Canada
European Center for Corporate Control Studies ( email )
2 rue de Mulhouse
Lille, 59800
France
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