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Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software

Kenneth C. Baseman
Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA)

Frederick R. Warren-Boulton
Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA)

Glenn A. Woroch
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics



Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 2, Pp. 265-315, Summer 1995

Abstract:     
This article examines Microsoft's licensing practices for its MS-DOS and Microsoft Windows operating system software. Our main focus is on Microsoft's use of CPU (central processing unit, or per-processor) licenses, under which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of personal computers pays a royalty for each machine it ships instead of for each unit of MS-DOS installed. We also examine Microsoft's practice of requiring in these licenses a minimum number of personal computers (PCs) on which MS-DOS can be installed, Microsoft's tying of Microsoft Windows and technical support information to the sale of MS-DOS, and Microsoft's attempts to induce technical incompatibility between MS-DOS and its main competitor, DR-DOS. Finally, we turn to the proposed consent decree between Microsoft and the Department of Justice.

JEL Classifications: K21, L41, L42

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: September 22, 2000 ; Last revised: October 11, 2000

Suggested Citation

Baseman, Kenneth C., Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. and Woroch, Glenn A., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software. Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 2, Pp. 265-315, Summer 1995. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=241988 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.241988


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Contact Information

Glenn A. Woroch (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
Kenneth C. Baseman
Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA) ( email )
Demonet Building
1155 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 900
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Frederick R. Warren-Boulton
Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA) ( email )
Demonet Building
1155 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 900
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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