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Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software
Kenneth C. Baseman Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA) Frederick R. Warren-Boulton Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. (MiCRA) Glenn A. Woroch University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 2, Pp. 265-315, Summer 1995 Abstract: This article examines Microsoft's licensing practices for its MS-DOS and Microsoft Windows operating system software. Our main focus is on Microsoft's use of CPU (central processing unit, or per-processor) licenses, under which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of personal computers pays a royalty for each machine it ships instead of for each unit of MS-DOS installed. We also examine Microsoft's practice of requiring in these licenses a minimum number of personal computers (PCs) on which MS-DOS can be installed, Microsoft's tying of Microsoft Windows and technical support information to the sale of MS-DOS, and Microsoft's attempts to induce technical incompatibility between MS-DOS and its main competitor, DR-DOS. Finally, we turn to the proposed consent decree between Microsoft and the Department of Justice.
JEL Classifications: K21, L41, L42 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 22, 2000 ; Last revised: October 11, 2000Suggested CitationContact Information
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