Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424860
 


 



Growth Through Rigidity: An Explanation of the Rise of CEO Pay


Kelly Shue


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard R. Townsend


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business

April 06, 2014

Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2424860
Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-22

Abstract:     
We explore a rigidity-based explanation of the dramatic and off-trend growth in US executive compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s. We show that executive option and stock grants are rigid in the number of shares granted. In addition, salary and bonus exhibit downward nominal rigidity. Rigidity implies that the value of executive pay will grow with firm equity returns, which averaged 30% annually during the Tech Boom. Rigidity can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth rates between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. Regulatory changes requiring the disclosure of the value of option grants help explain the moderation in executive pay in the late 2000s. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that number-rigidity in executive pay is generated by money illusion and rule-of-thumb decision-making.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

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Date posted: April 15, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Shue, Kelly and Townsend, Richard R., Growth Through Rigidity: An Explanation of the Rise of CEO Pay (April 06, 2014). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2424860; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424860 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2424860

Contact Information

Kelly Shue (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/kellyshue/

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Richard R. Townsend
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
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