Double Remedies in Double Courts
Chicago Kent College of Law
Thomas H. Lee
Fordham University School of Law
April 25, 2014
European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2429410
Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-10
This Article uses an ongoing trade controversy litigated in U.S. courts and the World Trade Organization dispute resolution system as a vehicle for exploring different models to deal with parallel adjudications in different legal systems between the same or related parties on the same issue. In lieu of more traditional models of subordination or first-to-decide sequencing, the Article proposes an engagement model as a solution to the double courts, single issue problem.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, international law, U.S., Europe, legal systems, engagement model, double courts, double remedies
JEL Classification: K30, K33, K39Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 27, 2014 ; Last revised: June 4, 2014
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