Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429410
 


 



Double Remedies in Double Courts


Sungjoon Cho


Chicago Kent College of Law

Thomas H. Lee


Fordham University School of Law

April 25, 2014

European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2429410
Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-10

Abstract:     
This Article uses an ongoing trade controversy litigated in U.S. courts and the World Trade Organization dispute resolution system as a vehicle for exploring different models to deal with parallel adjudications in different legal systems between the same or related parties on the same issue. In lieu of more traditional models of subordination or first-to-decide sequencing, the Article proposes an engagement model as a solution to the double courts, single issue problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, international law, U.S., Europe, legal systems, engagement model, double courts, double remedies

JEL Classification: K30, K33, K39

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Date posted: April 27, 2014 ; Last revised: June 4, 2014

Suggested Citation

Cho, Sungjoon and Lee, Thomas H., Double Remedies in Double Courts (April 25, 2014). European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2429410; Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429410

Contact Information

Sungjoon Cho
Chicago Kent College of Law ( email )
565 W. Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661-3691
United States

Thomas H. Lee (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
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