Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429767
 
 

References (30)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis


Bo Becker


Stockholm School of Economics

Victoria Ivashina


Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 25, 2014

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 14-13
Paris December 2014 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI Paper

Abstract:     
By the end of 2013, the share of government debt held by the domestic banking sectors of Eurozone countries was more than twice its 2007 level. We show that this type of increasing reliance on the domestic banking sector for absorbing government bonds generates a crowding out of corporate lending. For a given domestic firm, new debt is less likely to be a loan — i.e., the loan supply contracts — when local banks have purchased more domestic sovereign debt and when that debt is risky (as measured by CDS spreads). These effects are most pronounced in the period following the second Greek bailout in early 2010.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Credit Cycles, Sovereign Debt, Financial Repression

JEL Classification: G11, G22, G30

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: April 27, 2014 ; Last revised: September 26, 2014

Suggested Citation

Becker, Bo and Ivashina, Victoria, Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (April 25, 2014). Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 14-13; Paris December 2014 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429767 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2429767

Contact Information

Bo Becker
Stockholm School of Economics ( email )
Drottninggatan 98
Dept. of Finance
111 60 Stockholm, 11160
Sweden

Victoria Ivashina (Contact Author)
Harvard University ( email )
Harvard Business School
Baker Library 233
Boston, MA 02163
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 603
Downloads: 199
Download Rank: 90,672
References:  30
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.406 seconds