Alan Westin's Privacy Homo Economicus

Chris Jay Hoofnagle

School of Information; School of Law, University of California, Berkeley

Jennifer M. Urban

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

May 19, 2014

49 Wake Forest Law Review 261 (2014)
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2434800

Homo economicus reliably makes an appearance in regulatory debates concerning information privacy. Under the still-dominant U.S. “notice and choice” approach to consumer information privacy, the rational consumer is expected to negotiate for privacy protection by reading privacy policies and selecting services consistent with her preferences. A longstanding model for predicting these preferences is Professor Alan Westin's well-known segmentation of consumers into “privacy pragmatists,” “privacy fundamentalists,” and “privacy unconcerned.”

To be tenable as a protection for consumer interest, “notice and choice” requires homo economicus to be broadly reliable as a model. Consumers behaving according to the model will know what they want and how to get it in the marketplace, limiting regulatory approaches to information privacy. While notice and choice is undergoing strong theoretical, empirical, and political critique, U.S. Internet privacy law largely reflects these assumptions.

This Article contributes to the ongoing debate about notice and choice in two main ways. First, we consider the legacy Westin's privacy segmentation model itself, which as greatly influenced the development of the notice-and-choice regime. Second, we report on original survey research, collected over four years, exploring Americans’ knowledge, preferences, and attitudes about a wide variety of data practices in online and mobile markets. Using these methods, we engage in considered textual analysis, empirical testing, and critique of Westin’s segmentation model.

Our work both calls into question longstanding assumptions used by Westin and lends new insight into consumers’ privacy knowledge and preferences. A close textual look at factual and theoretical assumptions embedded in the segmentation model shows foundational flaws. With testing, we find that the segmentation model lacks validity in important dimensions. In analyzing data from nationwide, telephonic surveys of Internet and mobile phone users, we find an apparent knowledge gap among consumers concerning business practices and legal protections for privacy, calling into question Westin’s conclusion that a majority of consumers act pragmatically. We further find that those categorized as “privacy pragmatists” act differently from Westin’s model when directly presented with the value exchange — and thus the privacy tradeoff — offered with these services.

These findings reframe the privacy pragmatist and call her influential status in U.S. research, industry practice, and policy into serious question. Under the new view, she cannot be seen as “pragmatic” at all, but rather as a consumer making choices in the marketplace with substantial deficits in her understanding of business practices. This likewise calls into question policy decisions based on the segmentation model and its assumptions. We conclude that updated research and a policy approach that addresses both rationality and knowledge gaps are key.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Westin, privacy segmentation, knowledge gap, rational choice, consumer privacy, survey research, poll, mobile privacy

JEL Classification: D18

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Date posted: May 29, 2014 ; Last revised: July 26, 2015

Suggested Citation

Hoofnagle, Chris Jay and Urban, Jennifer M., Alan Westin's Privacy Homo Economicus (May 19, 2014). 49 Wake Forest Law Review 261 (2014); UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2434800. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434800

Contact Information

Chris Jay Hoofnagle (Contact Author)
School of Information ( email )
212 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States
510-643-0213 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley ( email )
344 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-0213 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu
Jennifer M. Urban
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 642-7338 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.samuelsonclinic.org
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