Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436272
 


 



Can Information Be Locked-Up? Informed Trading Ahead of Macro-News Announcements


Gennaro Bernile


Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business

Jianfeng Hu


Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business

Yuehua Tang


Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business

August 23, 2015

Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference Paper

Abstract:     
Government agencies routinely allow pre-release access to information to accredited news agencies under embargo agreements. Using high frequency data, we find evidence consistent with informed trading during news embargoes of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) scheduled announcements. The E-mini S&P 500 futures’ average abnormal order imbalance is statistically significant and in the direction of subsequent policy surprises. Moreover, the information contained in order imbalances predicts the market reaction to FOMC announcements. We estimate that pre-release informed trades’ aggregate profits range between $4.5 and $210.5 million. Notably, we find no evidence of informed trading prior to the start of FOMC news embargoes or during lockups ahead of nonfarm payroll, PPI, and GDP data releases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 81

Keywords: Media Lockup, News Embargo, Informed Trading, FOMC Announcement, Macroeconomic News

JEL Classification: E59, G14, G18, K29


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Date posted: May 13, 2014 ; Last revised: August 25, 2015

Suggested Citation

Bernile, Gennaro and Hu, Jianfeng and Tang, Yuehua, Can Information Be Locked-Up? Informed Trading Ahead of Macro-News Announcements (August 23, 2015). Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436272

Contact Information

Gennaro Bernile (Contact Author)
Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )
50 Stamford Road
Level 4
Singapore, 178899
Singapore
+65-68085478 (Phone)

Jianfeng Hu
Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )
50 Stamford Road
Singapore, 178899
Singapore
(+65) 68085477 (Phone)

Yuehua Tang
Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )
50 Stamford Road
Singapore, 178899
Singapore
+65 6808-5475 (Phone)
+65 6828-0427 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/yuehuatang/

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