Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?
Benjamin G. Edelman
Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
May 12, 2014
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400
I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, then identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: Competition, antitrust, Google, tying
JEL Classification: K21; L86
Date posted: May 15, 2014 ; Last revised: July 25, 2015
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