Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436940
 


 



Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?


Benjamin G. Edelman


Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit

May 12, 2014

Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400

Abstract:     
I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, then identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Competition, antitrust, Google, tying

JEL Classification: K21; L86


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Date posted: May 15, 2014 ; Last revised: July 25, 2015

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Benjamin G., Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling? (May 12, 2014). Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436940

Contact Information

Benjamin G. Edelman (Contact Author)
Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.hbs.edu/bedelman
Feedback to SSRN


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