Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436940
 


 



Leveraging Market Power Through Tying and Bundling: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively?


Benjamin G. Edelman


Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit

May 12, 2014

Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-112

Abstract:     
I examine Google’s pattern and practice of tying and bundling to leverage its dominance into new sectors under antitrust law principles. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, and I identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google’s tying and bundling tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 75

Keywords: Competition, antitrust, google, tying, bundling

JEL Classification: K21; L86

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Date posted: May 15, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Benjamin G., Leveraging Market Power Through Tying and Bundling: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively? (May 12, 2014). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-112. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436940

Contact Information

Benjamin G. Edelman (Contact Author)
Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.hbs.edu/bedelman
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