Leveraging Market Power Through Tying and Bundling: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively?
Benjamin G. Edelman
Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
May 12, 2014
Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-112
I examine Google’s pattern and practice of tying and bundling to leverage its dominance into new sectors under antitrust law principles. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, and I identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google’s tying and bundling tactics are suspect under antitrust law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 75
Keywords: Competition, antitrust, google, tying, bundling
JEL Classification: K21; L86working papers series
Date posted: May 15, 2014
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