A New Light on Public Company Political Spending Disclosure

Michael D. Guttentag

Loyola Marymount University

May 16, 2014

Columbia Business Law Review, 2014, Forthcoming
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-25

Mandatory disclosure is a central feature of securities regulation in the United States, yet there is little agreement regarding precisely how the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should determine what public companies are required to disclose. The current debate about whether the SEC should require the disclosure of political spending by public companies is but one example of this lack of consensus.

In this Article I first answer the more general question of how to evaluate any proposed public company mandatory disclosure requirement. I then apply this new evaluation method to the specific question of whether public companies should be required to disclose political spending. This analysis shows, based, in part, on previously unpublished empirical findings, that the evidence does not support requiring public companies to disclose political spending.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Securities Regulation, Disclosure, Political Spending, Public Companies

JEL Classification: K22

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Date posted: May 18, 2014 ; Last revised: May 20, 2014

Suggested Citation

Guttentag, Michael D., A New Light on Public Company Political Spending Disclosure (May 16, 2014). Columbia Business Law Review, 2014, Forthcoming; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2438078

Contact Information

Michael D. Guttentag (Contact Author)
Loyola Marymount University ( email )
7900 Loyola Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States
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