Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439759
 


 



Incentives and Ideology


James Kwak


University of Connecticut - School of Law

May 20, 2014

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 7, p. F253–58, 2014

Abstract:     
This is a response to Adam Levitin's article, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991 (2014). Levitin discusses various reasons for regulatory capture and highlights several potential solutions that aim to change the political governance of financial regulation. In this response, I highlight the importance of ideology (in this case, the ideology of free financial markets) in producing regulatory outcomes that are good for industry, and therefore the need for solutions that mitigate ideological capture.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: financial regulation, ideology, financial crisis

JEL Classification: G18, G28

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Date posted: May 23, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Kwak, James, Incentives and Ideology (May 20, 2014). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 7, p. F253–58, 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439759

Contact Information

James Kwak (Contact Author)
University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )
65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://law.uconn.edu/faculty/profiles/james-kwak
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