Incentives and Ideology
University of Connecticut - School of Law
May 20, 2014
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 7, p. F253–58, 2014
This is a response to Adam Levitin's article, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991 (2014). Levitin discusses various reasons for regulatory capture and highlights several potential solutions that aim to change the political governance of financial regulation. In this response, I highlight the importance of ideology (in this case, the ideology of free financial markets) in producing regulatory outcomes that are good for industry, and therefore the need for solutions that mitigate ideological capture.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: financial regulation, ideology, financial crisis
JEL Classification: G18, G28Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 23, 2014
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