References (83)


Citations (523)



The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence

Richard S. Ruback

Harvard Business School

Michael C. Jensen

Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 5-50, 1983

This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. With the exception of actions that exclude potential bidders, it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm shareholders. Finally, we argue the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Corporate control, managing corporate resources, control rights, target firms, takeover market, wealth effects of takeovers, stockholder returns, returns to targets, returns to bidders, antitrust, takeover regulation, manager-stockholder conflict(s), antitakeover amendments.

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 31, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Ruback, Richard S. and Jensen, Michael C., The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 5-50, 1983. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=244158 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244158

Contact Information

Richard S. Ruback
Harvard Business School ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6422 (Phone)
617-496-8443 (Fax)
Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
B-1050 Brussels
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 34,955
Downloads: 11,359
Download Rank: 215
References:  83
Citations:  523

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.235 seconds