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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW) May 2001 Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 55; CESifo Working Paper Series No. 474 Abstract: In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Keywords: Common Pool Resources, Experiments, Fairness, Reciprocity, Game Theory, Fairness Models Working Paper SeriesDate posted: November 10, 2000 ; Last revised: August 10, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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