J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness
Hillary A. Sale
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law
May 1, 2014
Brooklyn Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 1630, 2014
Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-05-04
Though corporations are private actors, their choices, statements, and strategies do not occur in a vacuum — they are subject to public scrutiny. In spite of a desire to control a particular conversation, companies often fail to properly consider, and account for, the vetting and reframing process that occurs once the conversation becomes public. This failure can lead to a spiral of publicness, subjecting the private actor and its decisions to increasing public scrutiny.
Through the lens of my previously developed theory of publicness, this essay explores the aftermath of the “London Whale” at J.P. Morgan. I argue that the Company’s handling of the Whale losses and ensuing events were not only caused by publicness but also resulted in publicness.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: securities regulation, disclosure, publicness, board of directors, shareholder vote, J.P. Morgan, London WhaleAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 7, 2014
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