Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446069
 


 



J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness


Hillary A. Sale


Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law

May 1, 2014

Brooklyn Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 1630, 2014
Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-05-04

Abstract:     
Though corporations are private actors, their choices, statements, and strategies do not occur in a vacuum — they are subject to public scrutiny. In spite of a desire to control a particular conversation, companies often fail to properly consider, and account for, the vetting and reframing process that occurs once the conversation becomes public. This failure can lead to a spiral of publicness, subjecting the private actor and its decisions to increasing public scrutiny.

Through the lens of my previously developed theory of publicness, this essay explores the aftermath of the “London Whale” at J.P. Morgan. I argue that the Company’s handling of the Whale losses and ensuing events were not only caused by publicness but also resulted in publicness.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: securities regulation, disclosure, publicness, board of directors, shareholder vote, J.P. Morgan, London Whale

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 7, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Sale, Hillary A., J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness (May 1, 2014). Brooklyn Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 1630, 2014; Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-05-04. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446069

Contact Information

Hillary A. Sale (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law ( email )
Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 206
Downloads: 48

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.344 seconds