Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447920
 


 



Understanding Uncontested Director Elections


Yonca Ertimur


University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting

Fabrizio Ferri


Columbia Business School - Accounting, Business Law & Taxation

David Oesch


University of Zurich

November 20, 2015


Abstract:     
We examine the determinants and consequences of voting outcomes in uncontested director elections. Exploiting a unique hand-collected dataset of the rationale behind proxy advisors’ recommendations — the primary driver of voting outcomes —, we document the director and board characteristics that voting shareholders focus on (as well as those that they neglect), their evolution over time and their relative importance. Absent a negative recommendation, high votes withheld are infrequent, highlighting the agenda setting role of proxy advisors. While high votes withheld rarely result in director turnover, our analyses show that firms often respond to an adverse vote by explicitly addressing the underlying concern. Overall, it appears that shareholders use their votes in uncontested director elections to get directors to address specific problems, rather than to vote them on or off the board, but they do so only on matters highlighted by the proxy advisors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: director elections, shareholder votes, proxy advisors, board of directors, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: G34, G30, M40


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Date posted: June 10, 2014 ; Last revised: November 21, 2015

Suggested Citation

Ertimur, Yonca and Ferri, Fabrizio and Oesch, David, Understanding Uncontested Director Elections (November 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447920 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2447920

Contact Information

Yonca Ertimur
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting ( email )
419 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States
Fabrizio Ferri (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Accounting, Business Law & Taxation ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

David Oesch
University of Zurich ( email )
Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
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