Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank Responses to the Durbin Amendment
Benjamin S. Kay
U.S. Treasury Office of Financial Research
Mark D. Manuszak
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Cindy M. Vojtech
Federal Reserve Board
The Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 alters the competitive structure of the debit card payment processing industry and caps debit card interchange fees for banks with over $10 billion in assets. Market participants predicted that debit card issuers would offset the reduction in debit interchange revenue by increases in customer account fees. Some participants also predicted that banks would cut costs in response to the law by reducing staff and shutting down branches. Using a difference-in-differences testing strategy, we show that debit interchange fee income fell for treated banks, leading to a fall in noninterest income. We also find that banks only partially offset this loss with deposit fees. We document that treated banks neither reduced costs nor strategically avoided the $10 billion threshold.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
Keywords: Durbin Amendment, Debit Cards, Dodd-Frank, Bank Competition, Retail Banking
JEL Classification: G21, G23, G28, L51
Date posted: June 13, 2014 ; Last revised: September 30, 2014
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.797 seconds