Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2449341
 


 



The Price of Silence: When No One Asks Questions during Conference Calls


Shuping Chen


University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

Stephan Hollander


Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Kelvin Law


Tilburg University

July 15, 2015


Abstract:     
This paper documents unintended adverse consequences of absence of information acquisition activity in firms' conference calls. When no one asks questions during a conference call’s questionand-answer (Q&A) session, firms experience a 13% smaller reduction in information asymmetry and downward pressure on their stock price (i.e., next-day abnormal return is 72 basis points lower). Our results hold across three identification strategies, and extend to conference calls where the number of questions raised falls far below expectations. Our analysis contributes to a nascent literature by showing that, in addition to the absence of managerial disclosure activity, absence of information acquisition activity contains information, and has direct implications for managers in improving their investor relations programs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

Keywords: Conference calls, corporate disclosure, information asymmetry, investor relations

JEL Classification: M41, G12, G14


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Date posted: June 14, 2014 ; Last revised: July 16, 2015

Suggested Citation

Chen, Shuping and Hollander, Stephan and Law, Kelvin, The Price of Silence: When No One Asks Questions during Conference Calls (July 15, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2449341 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2449341

Contact Information

Shuping Chen (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
521.471.5328 (Phone)
Stephan Hollander
Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8288 (Phone)
+31 13 466 8001 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.uvt.nl/people/s.hollander
Kelvin Law
Tilburg University ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/kelvinlaw2012
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