Does Copyright Enforcement Encourage Piracy?
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy; Indiana University - Department of Economics
Claremont Colleges - Claremont McKenna College
August 1, 2001
Claremont Colleges Working Paper No. 2001-14
More intensive copyright enforcement reduces piracy, raises prices, and lowers consumer surplus. We show that these results do not hold regarding the extent rather than intensity of enforcement. When enforcement is targeted at high-value buyers such as corporate and government users, the copyright holder has an incentive to charge super-monopoly prices, thereby encouraging piracy among low-value buyers. Extending enforcement down the demand curve broadens the copyright holder's captive market, leading to lower prices and higher sales that can increase both profits and consumer surplus. The standard tradeoff between the incentive to generate intellectual property and the cost of monopoly power is therefore avoided. New technologies which lead to stronger control over illicit use can paradoxically benefit consumers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
Keywords: piracy, internet, intellectual property, copyright protection
JEL Classification: K11, K42, L86working papers series
Date posted: December 2, 2000 ; Last revised: May 13, 2014
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